What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?

被引：20

作者：

Elsaid, Eahab ^{[1
]}

Davidson, Wallace N., III ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Windsor, Accounting & Finance Dept, Windsor, ON N9B 3P4, Canada

[2] Southern Illinois Univ, Finance Dept, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE | 2009年 / 49卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO turnover; CEO succession; Compensation; Corporate governance;

D O I：

10.1016/j.qref.2008.04.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors' contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary. (c) 2008 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：424 / 447

页数：24

共 61 条

[1] Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?
Agrawal, A
Knoeber, CR
Tsoulouhas, T
[J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2006, 12 (03) : 619 - 644
[2] Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics
Barber, BM
Lyon, JD
[J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1996, 41 (03) : 359 - 399
[3] THE ROLE OF CORPORATE-LAW IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
BAYSINGER, BD
BUTLER, HN
[J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1985, 28 (01) : 179 - 191
[4] The growth of executive pay
Bebchuk, L
Grinstein, Y
[J]. OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 2005, 21 (02) : 283 - 303
[5] Bebchuk L.A., 2004, PAY PERFORMANCE UNFU
[6] The value of an heir apparent in succession planning
Behn, BK
Riley, RA
Yang, YW
[J]. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2005, 13 (02) : 168 - 177
[7] PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESSOR CHOICE - THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP
BOEKER, W
GOODSTEIN, J
[J]. ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1993, 36 (01) : 172 - 186
[8] Brickley JA., 1997, J CORP FINANC, V3, P189, DOI [10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2, DOI 10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2, 10.1016/s0929-1199(96)00013-2]
[9] Cannella AA, 2001, ACAD MANAGE J, V44, P252, DOI 10.2307/3069454
[10] SUCCESSION AS A SOCIOPOLITICAL PROCESS - INTERNAL IMPEDIMENTS TO OUTSIDER SELECTION
CANNELLA, AA
LUBATKIN, M
[J]. ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1993, 36 (04) : 763 - 793

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 →