AGENDAS, STRATEGIC VOTING, AND SIGNALING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：42

作者：

ORDESHOOK, PC ^{[1
]}

PALFREY, TR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TEXAS,AUSTIN,TX 78712

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 1988年 / 32卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2111131

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：441 / 466

页数：26

共 17 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

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[7] INTRANSITIVITIES IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODELS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENDA CONTROL [J].

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[8] GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR GLOBAL INTRANSITIVITIES IN FORMAL VOTING MODELS [J].

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[9] GRAPH-THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THEORY OF VOTING [J].

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[10] NEW SOLUTION SET FOR TOURNAMENTS AND MAJORITY VOTING - FURTHER GRAPH-THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF VOTING [J].

MILLER, NR .

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