COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS AND COMPLIANCE NORMS - A FORMAL THEORY OF GROUP-MEDIATED SOCIAL-CONTROL

[1] Allen W. S., 1965, NAZI SEIZURE POWER E

[2] Andenaes J., 1974, PUNISHMENT DETERRENC

[3] FORMAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS - COMPARISON OF DETERRENT EFFECTS [J]. SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 1977, 25 (01) : 103 - 114

[4] [Anonymous], 1978, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE CR

[5] AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1095 - 1111

[6] Becker G., 1976, EC APPROACH HUMAN BE

[7] COOPERATION AND GROUP-SIZE IN N-PERSON PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1976, 20 (04) : 687 - 706

[8] RECENT ECONOMETRIC MODELING OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - SUPPORT FOR THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS [J]. EVALUATION REVIEW, 1980, 4 (02) : 147 - 191

[9] Cohen A.K., 1955, DELINQUENT BOYS

[10] Coleman J. S., 1986, PARADOXICAL EFFECTS, P55, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_6

[1] Allen W. S., 1965, NAZI SEIZURE POWER E

[2] Andenaes J., 1974, PUNISHMENT DETERRENC

[3] FORMAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS - COMPARISON OF DETERRENT EFFECTS [J]. SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 1977, 25 (01) : 103 - 114

[4] [Anonymous], 1978, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE CR

[5] AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) : 1095 - 1111

[6] Becker G., 1976, EC APPROACH HUMAN BE

[7] COOPERATION AND GROUP-SIZE IN N-PERSON PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1976, 20 (04) : 687 - 706

[8] RECENT ECONOMETRIC MODELING OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - SUPPORT FOR THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS [J]. EVALUATION REVIEW, 1980, 4 (02) : 147 - 191

[9] Cohen A.K., 1955, DELINQUENT BOYS

[10] Coleman J. S., 1986, PARADOXICAL EFFECTS, P55, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_6