COMPARING AUCTIONS FOR RISK AVERSE BUYERS - A BUYERS POINT-OF-VIEW

被引：119

作者：

MATTHEWS, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,DEPT ECON,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1987年 / 55卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913603

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：633 / 646

页数：14

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