INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R-AND-D IN DUOPOLY

被引：43

作者：

MARJIT, S

机构：

[1] Jadavpur University, Calcutta

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 37卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90129-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper tries to explain why duopolistic firms would like to enter cooperative R and D venture even when they would act non-cooperatively in the product market. We show that both 'very high' and 'very low' probabilities of success in R and D can induce firms to go for R and D joint ventures. This research highlights the modus operandi for cooperative research even without and 'spillover' of individual R and D and/or with a reasonably 'low' sunk cost of R and D. © 1991.

引用

页码：187 / 191

页数：5