TRUTH IN FICTION - THE STORY CONTINUED

被引:53
作者
BYRNE, A
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1080/00048409312345022
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Narrative fiction, with which I shall exclusively be concerned here, contains many falsehoods. There is no such person as Sherlock Holmes, no such place as Lilliput, no community of talking rabbits on Watership Down or anywhere else, and there never has been, nor ever will be, such a sustained sequence of horrors as those Sade catalogues in 120 Days in Sodom. But all these actual falsehoods are true in their respective fictions. In the first part of this paper I criticise the accounts of truth in fiction which have been proposed by David Lewis2 and Gregory Currie.3 In the second part I offer a rival account. © 1993, Australasian Association of Philosophy. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 35
页数:12
相关论文
共 10 条
[1]   FICTIONAL NAMES AND NARRATING CHARACTERS - DISCUSSION [J].
CONTER, D .
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1991, 69 (03) :319-328
[2]  
Currie Gregory, 1990, NATURE FICTION
[3]  
FORSYTH F, DAY OF JACKAL
[4]  
GOLDING W, LORD OF FLIES
[5]  
HUBER CL, 1989, SHERLOCK HOLMES GAS
[6]  
Kripke S., 1980, NAMING NECESSITY
[7]  
Lewis D., 1983, PHILOS PAP, VI
[8]  
RODIN AE, 1989, BAKER STREET DOZEN
[9]  
SPERBER D, 1986, RELEVANCE, P182
[10]  
Walton K., 1990, MIMESIS MAKE BELIEVE