MAJORITY RULE UNDER TRANSITIVITY CONSTRAINTS

[1] Arrow K.J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] ARROWS IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1969, 12 (02) : 227 - 248

[3] Black Duncan, 1958, THEORY COMMITTEES EL

[4] BOWMAN VJ, TO BE PUBLISHED

[5] BOWMAN VJ, 1971, 92701 CARN MELL U WO

[6] BOWMAN VJ, 1972, SIAM J APPLIED MATHE, V22

[7] A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CYCLICAL MAJORITIES [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1965, 75 (300) : 853 - 857

[8] DAVIS OA, 1972, ECONOMETRICA JAN

[9] PROBABILITY OF A CYCLICAL MAJORITY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1970, 38 (02) : 345 - &

[10] DEMEYER F, 1968, JUN C MATH THEOR EL

[1] Arrow K.J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] ARROWS IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1969, 12 (02) : 227 - 248

[3] Black Duncan, 1958, THEORY COMMITTEES EL

[4] BOWMAN VJ, TO BE PUBLISHED

[5] BOWMAN VJ, 1971, 92701 CARN MELL U WO

[6] BOWMAN VJ, 1972, SIAM J APPLIED MATHE, V22

[7] A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CYCLICAL MAJORITIES [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1965, 75 (300) : 853 - 857

[8] DAVIS OA, 1972, ECONOMETRICA JAN

[9] PROBABILITY OF A CYCLICAL MAJORITY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1970, 38 (02) : 345 - &

[10] DEMEYER F, 1968, JUN C MATH THEOR EL