CHOICE OF COMPULSORY INSURANCE SCHEMES UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION

被引:10
作者
JOHNSON, WR [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV VIRGINIA,CHARLOTTESVILLE,VA 22903
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01718972
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:23 / 35
页数:13
相关论文
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