IMPLEMENTATION VIA NASH EQUILIBRIA

被引：59

作者：

DANILOV, V

机构：

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1992年 / 60卷 / 01期

关键词：

IMPLEMENTATION; MECHANISM; MONOTONICITY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE;

D O I：

10.2307/2951675

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper is concerned with a problem of implementation of a given social choice correspondence (SCC). We introduce an essential monotonicity condition and show that any implementable SCC satisfies this condition. Conversely, in a case of three or more participants any essentially monotone SCC is implementable. In a case of two participants the essential monotonicity condition must be completed by a requirement that the SCC is close to an individually rational correspondence.

引用

页码：43 / 56

页数：14