Jurisprudence and Communication: Secular and Religious

In considering Van Schooten's study of the Eric O. case (s.1), I ask whether the different approaches taken by the two different "legal institutions"-the prosecuting authorities on the one hand, the courts on the other-are reflective of different images of warfare (a semantic difference) or of the different images each group holds of its own role (a pragmatic difference). If we consider these two "legal institutions" as distinct semiotic groups (s.2), is there an inevitable "communication deficit" (Van Schooten) between them (and the public) and how does this relate to the Hartian account of such a "crisis in communication" (s.3)? I agree with Van Schooten about the role of underlying images in the construction of legal sense, and relate this to the issue of intuitional judgment, both in and outside the law (s.4). I then turn to comparable issues which arise in my other research area, Jewish law, which reflects quite different ideological premises (s.5), reviewing the original (biblical) conception of the (intuitive) role and functions of judges (s.5A), decision-making, justification and consequentialist ethics in postbiblical Jewish law (s.5B), and the conclusions drawn, not least for the pragmatics of communication, in a recent research study on the wife's rights in divorce. Paradoxically, I argue (s.5C), that the system rests at base on trust rather than objective truth. But trust, too, is a form of meaning, and susceptible to semiotic analysis. I suggest, in conclusion (s.6), that this is an issue which should be treated more seriously in the theory of secular law and legal communication.