IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY

[1] [Anonymous], 1960, MATH SOC SCI

[2] Clarke E. H., 1971, PUBLIC CHOICE, P17, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01726210

[3] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 587 - 601

[4] COALITION INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 243 - 254

[5] CHARACTERIZATION OF SATISFACTORY MECHANISMS FOR REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-GOODS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (02) : 427 - 438

[6] OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC-GOODS - SOLUTION TO FREE RIDER PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (04) : 783 - 809

[7] INCENTIVES IN TEAMS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 617 - 631

[8] Groves T, 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P211, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8

[9] HAMMOND PJ, 1979, REV ECON STUD, V46, P181

[10] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334

[1] [Anonymous], 1960, MATH SOC SCI

[2] Clarke E. H., 1971, PUBLIC CHOICE, P17, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01726210

[3] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 587 - 601

[4] COALITION INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 243 - 254

[5] CHARACTERIZATION OF SATISFACTORY MECHANISMS FOR REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-GOODS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (02) : 427 - 438

[6] OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC-GOODS - SOLUTION TO FREE RIDER PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (04) : 783 - 809

[7] INCENTIVES IN TEAMS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 617 - 631

[8] Groves T, 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P211, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8

[9] HAMMOND PJ, 1979, REV ECON STUD, V46, P181

[10] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334