SAMURAI ACCOUNTANT - A THEORY OF AUDITING AND PLUNDER

被引：151

作者：

BORDER, KC ^{[1
]}

SOBEL, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1987年 / 54卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297481

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：525 / 540

页数：16

相关论文

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