Patent Law and the Assurance Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation

[1] Abramowicz M, 2003, VANDERBILT LAW REV, V56, P115

[2] ABRAMOWICZ M, 2003, VANDERBILT LAW REV, V56, P127

[3] Allison J., 2003, BERKELEY TECH LAW J, V18, P987

[4] Allison John R., 2003, BERKELEY TECH LJ, V18, P1079

[5] [Anonymous], 2003, LAW CONTEMP PROBL, DOI DOI 10.2139/SSRN.470983

[6] Arrow K. J., 1962, RATE DIRECTION INVEN, P609, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400879762-024

[7] Axelrod Robert, 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIV, P53

[8] Limiting patentees' market power without reducing innovation incentives: The perverse benefits of uncertainty and non-injunctive remedies [J]. MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 1999, 97 (04) : 985 - 1033

[9] Ayres Ian, 1999, MICH LAW REV, V97, P1007

[10] Bagley Margo A, 2003, William Mary Law Rev, V45, P469

[1] Abramowicz M, 2003, VANDERBILT LAW REV, V56, P115

[2] ABRAMOWICZ M, 2003, VANDERBILT LAW REV, V56, P127

[3] Allison J., 2003, BERKELEY TECH LAW J, V18, P987

[4] Allison John R., 2003, BERKELEY TECH LJ, V18, P1079

[5] [Anonymous], 2003, LAW CONTEMP PROBL, DOI DOI 10.2139/SSRN.470983

[6] Arrow K. J., 1962, RATE DIRECTION INVEN, P609, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400879762-024

[7] Axelrod Robert, 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIV, P53

[8] Limiting patentees' market power without reducing innovation incentives: The perverse benefits of uncertainty and non-injunctive remedies [J]. MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 1999, 97 (04) : 985 - 1033

[9] Ayres Ian, 1999, MICH LAW REV, V97, P1007

[10] Bagley Margo A, 2003, William Mary Law Rev, V45, P469