CEO turnover and firm performance, evidence from Thailand

被引：16

作者：

Rachpradit, Parichart ^{[1
]}

Tang, John C. S. ^{[2
]}

Khang, Do Ba ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Asian Inst Technol, Dept Business Management, Phitsanulok, Thailand

[2] Asian Inst Technol, Sch Management, Phitsanulok, Thailand

来源：

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY | 2012年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

Corporate governance; Boards of directors; Ownership; Chief executives; Corporate ownership; Thailand;

D O I：

10.1108/14720701211214061

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance and the moderating effects of ownership structure and board structure with respect to listed non-financial companies in Thailand. Design/methodology/approach - Logit model is employed to analyze the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. Findings - The paper finds that both ownership and board structure have effects on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The probability of CEO turnover is lower when the firm is controlled by family, the CEO is part of the controlling family, and board size is larger. Contrary to previous studies, sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is higher with the presence of CEO duality and lower degree of board independence. When a CEO continues to work beyond retirement age, the probability of turnover is not associated with firm performance. Originality/value - This study provides evidence that CEO duality and low independent board is not necessarily bad corporate governance practice for Thai companies and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, practitioners, and academic researchers.

引用

页码：164 / +

页数：16

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