STOPPING AGENTS FROM CHEATING

被引:74
作者
MA, CT
MOORE, J
TURNBULL, S
机构
[1] UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND
[2] OHIO STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,COLUMBUS,OH 43210
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(88)90136-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:355 / 372
页数:18
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