A SHRED OF EVIDENCE ON THEORIES OF WAGE STICKINESS

被引：168

作者：

BLINDER, AS ^{[1
]}

CHOI, DH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] RICE UNIV,SCH ARCHITECTURE,HOUSTON,TX 77251

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 105卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937882

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A small interview survey was undertaken to see how actual wage–setters would react to the central ideas of several economic theories of wage stickiness. Wage cuts were surprisingly prevalent in recent years, despite the booming economy. The strongest finding was that managers believe that perceptions of fairness play major motivational role in labor markets and that a "fair" wage policy is a good deal more complicated than simply not cutting wages. We also found substantial evidence for money illusion and against the adverse–selection version of the efficiency wage model. © 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

引用

页码：1003 / 1015

页数：13

共 17 条

[1] LABOR CONTRACTS AS PARTIAL GIFT EXCHANGE [J].