EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES WITH RECOMMENDED PLAY

被引：36

作者：

BRANDTS, J ^{[1
]}

MACLEOD, WB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MONTREAL,CTR RECH & DEV ECON,MONTREAL,PQ H3C 3J7,CANADA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 11卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1995.1040

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects' behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：36 / 63

页数：28

共 11 条

[1]

BRANDTS J, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P1350

[2]

COOPER RW, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P218

[3]

DAVIS DD, 1992, EQUILIBRIUM COOPERAT

[4] SOLUTIONS FOR SOME BARGAINING GAMES UNDER THE HARSANYI-SELTEN SOLUTION THEORY .1. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES [J].

HARSANYI, JC .

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1982, 3 (02) :179-191

[5] ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].

KOHLBERG, E ;

MERTENS, JF .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (05) :1003-1037

[6]

KOHLBERG E, 1989, UNPUB REFINEMENT NAS

[7] SIGNALING, FORWARD INDUCTION, AND STABILITY IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES [J].

OSBORNE, MJ .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1990, 50 (01) :22-36

[8]

Schelling Thomas C., 1980, STRATEGY CONFLICT

[9]

VANDAMME E, 1990, 6TH P WORLD C EC SOC

[10]

VANDAMME E, 1987, STABILITY PERFECTION

← 1 2 →