Public versus Private Information Provision

被引：0

作者：

Clements, Matthew ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] St Edwards Univ, Dept Econ, 3001 S Congress Ave, Austin, TX 78704 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC PAPERS | 2014年 / 33卷 / 04期

关键词：

asymmetric information; regulation; licensing;

D O I：

10.1111/1759-3441.12087

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When is it better for the government to provide information, and when is this role better left to the market? I present a simple framework for evaluating this question, where the key factors are the cost of errors based on imperfect information and whether information is eventually revealed to consumers. I then apply the framework to examples.

引用

页码：391 / 399

页数：9

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