STRATEGY SUBSETS CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOR

被引：126

作者：

BASU, K

WEIBULL, JW

机构：

[1] PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08544

[2] UNIV STOCKHOLM,S-10691 STOCKHOLM,SWEDEN

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90179-O

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior (curb) if it contains all its best replies. Each curb set contains the support of at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, but there are perfect Nash equilibria that are not contained in any minimal curb set. It is shown that every game with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions possesses at least one minimal curb set, that every minimal curb set is identical with its best replies and that it is contained in the set of rationalizable strategy profiles. © 1991.

引用

页码：141 / 146

页数：6