THE COMPLEXITY OF RESOURCE-ALLOCATION AND PRICE MECHANISMS UNDER BOUNDED RATIONALITY

被引：9
|
作者：
FRIEDMAN, EJ [1 ]
OREN, SS [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY, DEPT IEOR, BERKELEY, CA 94720 USA
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 1995年 / 6卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/BF01212489
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop a framework for desgining and evaluating the complexity of mechanisms that allocate resources in a distributed setting to agents or processors with bounded computational ability. We discuss several mechanisms and describe the construction of efficient price based mechanisms, which exploit the decentrlized aspects of the problem. These price mechanisms are polynomial in the number of resources, precision of the solution, and the logarithm of the number of agents.
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页码：225 / 250
页数：26
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