INFORMATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM

[1] AKERLOF G, 1970, Q J ECON, V89, P488

[2] BARZEL Y, 1976, SOME FALLACIES INTER

[3] Green J., 1973, 284 HARV I EC RES

[4] EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1976, 31 (02) : 573 - 585

[5] GROSSMAN SJ, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P246

[6] OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIUM WHEN MARKET STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 11 (03) : 418 - 443

[7] LAYARD R, 1974, J POLITICAL EC, V82, P82

[8] INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1977, 32 (02) : 371 - 387

[9] COMPETITIVE SIGNALLING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (02) : 174 - 186

[10] RILEY JG, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P254

[1] AKERLOF G, 1970, Q J ECON, V89, P488

[2] BARZEL Y, 1976, SOME FALLACIES INTER

[3] Green J., 1973, 284 HARV I EC RES

[4] EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1976, 31 (02) : 573 - 585

[5] GROSSMAN SJ, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P246

[6] OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIUM WHEN MARKET STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 11 (03) : 418 - 443

[7] LAYARD R, 1974, J POLITICAL EC, V82, P82

[8] INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1977, 32 (02) : 371 - 387

[9] COMPETITIVE SIGNALLING [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (02) : 174 - 186

[10] RILEY JG, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P254