AN ANALYTIC CHOICE APPROACH TO CONCURRENT MAJORITIES - THE RELEVANCE OF CALHOUN,JOHN,C. THEORY FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

John C. Calhoun proposed a constitutional design awarding each "major" interest in society a veto over government action, and thus assuring that no government action could occur at the expense of significant interests. This paper develops a simple formal model based on the assumptions and conditions outlined in Calhoun's theory to show that his design results in a decision process more stable than that expected under simple majority rule. Moreover, each interest included in the decision-making process would be protected aganist policy change that would make it worse off. By examining such a process in the simplified form used here, however, the problems unanswered by Calhoun become apparent and his response to such criticisms wholly inadequate. Three major concerns are evaluated-the assignment mechanism by which "major" interests would be identified; the problem of inaction; and the problem of collective action and inconsistency within veto groups.