DYNAMIC VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS

被引：100

作者：

FERSHTMAN, C

NITZAN, S

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60208

[2] BAR ILAN UNIV,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1991年 / 35卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(91)90004-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper considers a dynamic public goods problem in which individuals' contributions are accumulated over time. Analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game with continuous contributions and flow benefits, the paper demonstrates that the free riding problem is aggravated when players' contributions are conditional on the observable collective contributions. Hence, without commitment, an additional incentive to depress contributions arises; a current contributor can free ride on all future contributions as well as on current ones.

引用

页码：1057 / 1067

页数：11

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