INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：28
作者：
LEDYARD, JO
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1978年 / 18卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：171 / 189
页数：19
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