Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas

被引:1151
作者
Carey, JM [1 ]
Shugart, MS [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO, GRAD SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES, LA JOLLA, CA 92093 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.
引用
收藏
页码:417 / 439
页数:23
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