Managerial Ownership Structure and Earnings Management

被引:37
作者
Yang, Chi-Yih [1 ,2 ]
Lai, Hung-Neng [3 ]
Tan, Boon [2 ]
机构
[1] Minghsin Univ Sci & Technol, Xinfeng, Taiwan
[2] Xian Jiaotong Livepool Univ, Suzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Cent Univ, Taoyuan, Taiwan
关键词
Agency cost; Managerial ownership; Earnings management; Discretionary accruals;
D O I
10.1108/19852510880000634
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the relation between managerial ownership structure and earnings management. Unlike previous research which treats insiders as a homogeneous group, we further classify insiders into executives, outside directors, and blockholders to conduct an in-depth study. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using the modified Jones model. For a large sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period 1997 and 2004, we find that discretionary accruals first increase and then decrease with executive ownership, forming an inverted U-shaped relationship. However, discretionary accruals are positively affected by director ownership and blockholder ownership. The results suggest that equity stake owned by top officers of a firm should be encouraged in order to reduce agency cost, thus enhancing information content of earnings.
引用
收藏
页码:35 / +
页数:20
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