A DUOPOLY PRICING MODEL FOR WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS UNDER CONGESTION-SENSITIVE USERS

The development of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technologies offers a novel platform for IP-limed service resale via Wirier Mesh Networks (WMNet) that provide high network COW nue cal lower infrastructure cost. In this IP-based service resale business. the Access Point (AP) provider set their pricing policies an IP-based service renellern to maximize their profit. while the rwaste-users (end users of the WMNS) who are price- and quality-of-servive (QOS)- sensitive, respond to AP provider& pricing policies by controlling their onsets. In thin paper we study a two AP providers' price competition In a WMN. The two AP provider offer IP-based service fax possibly different preen and Onta in to of mean packet delay. The restaleywiers' cltoice between the APs in bawd on their conspennutcd utility. We consider a two stage game among the two AP provident and their mode-awns In stage I. the AP providers set their prices to maximise their polar respectively. In stage 3. given the prices and Qos offered by both AP provider, the nimbi-users decide which AP to nook service from or opt out of both APn. Then the game returns to stage I, in which both AP providern adjusts their optimal prices based on the decisions of the resale-users to seek equilibrium among themselves and their resale-users. With this game theoretical approach. we develop an analytical framework to and the Nash equilibrium points from which two AF's and resale-user would not move from