ON THE STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE OF EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

被引:31
|
作者
ELMES, S [1 ]
RENY, PJ [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV WESTERN ONTARIO,DEPT ECON,LONDON N6A 5C2,ONTARIO,CANADA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1994.1001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is argued that of Thompson's four elementary transformations, one (inflate-deflate) does not leave the strategic features of a game unchanged. It is shown, however, that two of the remaining transformations together with a modification of the third suffice for the purpose of reducing any finite extensive form game having perfect recall to its reduced (normal) form. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
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页码:1 / 23
页数:23
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