Regional competition, business politicians, and subnational fiscal policy

被引：6

作者：

Baccini, Leonardo ^{[1
]}

Li, Quan ^{[2
]}

Mirkina, Irina ^{[3
]}

Johnson, Kristina ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] McGill Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Polit Sci, College Stn, TX 77843 USA

[3] Lund Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Lund, Sweden

[4] Univ Massachusetts, Edward J Collins Jr Ctr Publ Management, Amherst, MA 01003 USA

来源：

BUSINESS AND POLITICS | 2018年 / 20卷 / 03期

关键词：

fiscal policy; decentralization; business and politics; Russia;

D O I：

10.1017/bap.2018.3

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

What explains subnational policy choices over tax cut after decentralization? We test two different explanations in the context of the 2002 tax reform in Russia. A popular strand of literature suggests that decentralization induces more regional competition over investment, motivating subnational tax cuts. A second body of literature suggests that personal business interests of regional governors can account for their different policy choices. Governors with personal business ties refrain from tax cuts because they increase market competition. We find no support for the regional competition hypothesis, but strong statistical evidence for the business connection hypothesis. Our findings have important implications for research on fiscal decentralization and on the connections between business interests of leaders and their policy choices.

引用

页码：410 / 437

页数：28

共 64 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2012, REG RUSS SOC EC IND

[2] CORPORATE TAX CUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT [J].