CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND MONETARY CONTROL

[1] COMPETITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND THE OPTIMAL SEIGNIORAGE [J]. JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1992, 24 (01) : 61 - 71

[2] Alesina A., 1988, NBER MACROECONOMICS

[3] BALTENSPERGER E, 1993, PRUDENTIAL REGULATIO

[4] Cukierman, 1993, CUADERNOS EC, V30, P271

[5] MEASURING THE INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS AND ITS EFFECT ON POLICY OUTCOMES [J]. WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1992, 6 (03) : 353 - 398

[6] CUKIERMAN A, IN PRESS FINANCIAL A

[7] CUKIERMAN A, 1994, UNPUB POLITICAL INFL

[8] CUKIERMAN A, 1991, 1991 JOINT CEPR PAOL

[9] Cukierman A., 1994, FRAMEWORK MONETARY S

[10] CUKIERMAN A, 1993, CARNEGIEROCHESTER C, V39

[1] COMPETITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND THE OPTIMAL SEIGNIORAGE [J]. JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1992, 24 (01) : 61 - 71

[2] Alesina A., 1988, NBER MACROECONOMICS

[3] BALTENSPERGER E, 1993, PRUDENTIAL REGULATIO

[4] Cukierman, 1993, CUADERNOS EC, V30, P271

[5] MEASURING THE INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS AND ITS EFFECT ON POLICY OUTCOMES [J]. WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1992, 6 (03) : 353 - 398

[6] CUKIERMAN A, IN PRESS FINANCIAL A

[7] CUKIERMAN A, 1994, UNPUB POLITICAL INFL

[8] CUKIERMAN A, 1991, 1991 JOINT CEPR PAOL

[9] Cukierman A., 1994, FRAMEWORK MONETARY S

[10] CUKIERMAN A, 1993, CARNEGIEROCHESTER C, V39