VERTICAL MERGERS AND MARKET FORECLOSURE

[1] Bork R., 1978, ANTITRUST PARADOX PO

[2] GREENHUT ML, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P137

[3] ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION - RAISING RIVALS COSTS TO ACHIEVE POWER OVER PRICE [J]. YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1986, 96 (02) : 209 - 293

[4] LONG-TERM BILATERAL MONOPOLY - THE CASE OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (01) : 89 - 104

[5] THEORY OF VERTICAL CONTROL WITH VARIABLE PROPORTIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (05) : 1009 - 1025

[6] MCBRIDE ME, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P1011

[7] PERRY MK, 1983, FORWARD INTEGRATION

[8] VERTICAL INTEGRATION - SCALE DISTORTIONS, PARTIAL INTEGRATION, AND THE DIRECTION OF PRICE CHANGE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 101 (01) : 131 - 147

[9] LOSSES FROM HORIZONTAL MERGER - THE EFFECTS OF AN EXOGENOUS CHANGE IN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (02) : 185 - 199

[10] SALINGER MA, 1987, FB8714 1ST BOST WORK

[1] Bork R., 1978, ANTITRUST PARADOX PO

[2] GREENHUT ML, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P137

[3] ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION - RAISING RIVALS COSTS TO ACHIEVE POWER OVER PRICE [J]. YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1986, 96 (02) : 209 - 293

[4] LONG-TERM BILATERAL MONOPOLY - THE CASE OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (01) : 89 - 104

[5] THEORY OF VERTICAL CONTROL WITH VARIABLE PROPORTIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (05) : 1009 - 1025

[6] MCBRIDE ME, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P1011

[7] PERRY MK, 1983, FORWARD INTEGRATION

[8] VERTICAL INTEGRATION - SCALE DISTORTIONS, PARTIAL INTEGRATION, AND THE DIRECTION OF PRICE CHANGE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 101 (01) : 131 - 147

[9] LOSSES FROM HORIZONTAL MERGER - THE EFFECTS OF AN EXOGENOUS CHANGE IN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (02) : 185 - 199

[10] SALINGER MA, 1987, FB8714 1ST BOST WORK