Local regulation may be excessively stringent

被引:45
作者
Glazer, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
关键词
federalism; environmental regulation;
D O I
10.1016/S0166-0462(99)90013-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A jurisdiction can export pollution by imposing regulations that induce firms causing the pollution to move elsewhere. Jurisdictions may therefore not "race to the bottom," but instead impose excessively stringent regulations. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:553 / 558
页数:6
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