THE FOLK THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

被引:41
作者
WEN, Q
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D O I
10.2307/2951740
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:949 / 954
页数:6
相关论文
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