Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

被引:0
作者
Clarke, Henry [1 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Philosophy, Gower St, London WC1E 6BT, England
来源
DISPUTATIO-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2016年 / 8卷 / 42期
关键词
Knowing how; practical knowledge; intellectualism; David Wiggins; Aristotle;
D O I
10.2478/disp-2016-0005
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Wiggins' (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.
引用
收藏
页码:113 / 124
页数:12
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