MEASURING CARTEL RENTS IN THE COLLEGE BASKETBALL PLAYER RECRUITMENT MARKET

被引：27
作者：
BROWN, RW
机构：
[1] University of North Texas, Department of Economics, Denton, TX 76203-3408
来源：
APPLIED ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 26卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1080/00036849400000058
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) prohibits direct payments to college athletes and limits the value of a scholarship to $20000. These rules restrict competition among schools for players so that players will not be paid their marginal revenue product. Therefore, rents are redistributed from players to schools. The rent generated by a premium college basketball player is measured. The empirical results show that a top college player may generate up to $1000000 in annual rents for his team.
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页码：27 / 34
页数：8
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