REPUDIATION AND RENEGOTIATION - THE CASE OF SOVEREIGN DEBT

被引:36
作者
GALE, D [1 ]
HELLWIG, M [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV BASEL,CH-4051 BASEL,SWITZERLAND
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2526545
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 31
页数:29
相关论文
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