HOW CORRUPTION MAY CORRUPT

被引：212

作者：

ANDVIG, JC ^{[1
]}

MOENE, KO ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV OSLO,N-0317 OSLO 3,NORWAY

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-G

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities. The model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption. There might be multiple self-fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered. © 1990.

引用

页码：63 / 76

页数：14

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