INTEREST ARBITRATION, OUTCOMES, AND THE INCENTIVE TO BARGAIN

被引：144

作者：

FARBER, HS

KATZ, HC

机构：

来源：

INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW | 1979年 / 33卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2523045

中图分类号：

F24 [劳动经济];

学科分类号：

020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：55 / 63

页数：9

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FEUILLE, P .

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1975, 14 (03) :302-310

[6]

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[7]

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[8]

Luce D, 1957, GAMES DECISIONS

[9]

MARCH JG, 1959, ORGANIZATIONS, P136

[10]

STERN JL, 1975, FINAL OFFER ARBITRAT