COMPETITION, ADVERTISING AND MEETING COMPETITION CLAUSES

被引：7

作者：

LEVY, DT

GERLOWSKI, DA

机构：

[1] University of Baltimore, Baltimore

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 37卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90214-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Pricing according to 'meeting competition clauses' (MCC's) is often argued to enforce collusive agreements. Our analysis incorporates uncertainty and advertising. We show, within a spatial model, that MCC's permit price discrimination, but at the expense of lower profits. © 1991.

引用

页码：217 / 221

页数：5

共 9 条

[1] MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PRICING AND TACIT COLLUSION [J].