Institutional arrangements in mutually beneficial grazing systems: an example from herding communities in Ethiopia

This article identifies factors that determine households' participation in institutional arrangements that permit reciprocal resource sharing in risky semi-arid environment. It explores the emerging challenges to clans' institutions in governing such arrangements. On the basis of evidence from eastern Ethiopia, the article indicates that expansion in enclosure of the commons and private water points have increasingly become barriers in facilitating cooperation. To the contrary, lineage-based social capital and establishment of interclan council play a crucial role in negotiation for non-exclusive rights. Attributes of grazing resources also reinforce the continuity of such practice. The policy environment that fails to provide special attention to the nature of land use and property rights to the grazing commons undermines herders' participation in reciprocal grazing resource sharing. This suggests that tenure policies supporting customary governance of the grazing commons enable herders to sustain their livelihoods.