STABILITY AND POLARIZATION OF INTERESTS IN JOB MATCHING

被引：209

作者：

ROTH, AE

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911460

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：47 / 57

页数：11

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