Detection of Faults and Attacks Including False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid Using Kalman Filter

By exploiting the communication infrastructure among the sensors, actuators, and control systems, attackers may compromise the security of smart-grid systems, with techniques such as denial-of-service (DoS) attack, random attack, and data-injection attack. In this paper, we present a mathematical model of the system to study these pitfalls and propose a robust security framework for the smart grid. Our framework adopts the Kalman filter to estimate the variables of a wide range of state processes in the model. The estimates from the Kalman filter and the system readings are then fed into the chi(2)-detector or the proposed Euclidean detector. The chi(2)-detector is a proven effective exploratory method used with the Kalman filter for the measurement of the relationship between dependent variables and a series of predictor variables. The chi(2)-detector can detect system faults/attacks, such as DoS attack, short-term, and long-term random attacks. However, the studies show that the chi(2)-detector is unable to detect the statistically derived false data-injection attack. To overcome this limitation, we prove that the Euclidean detector can effectively detect such a sophisticated injection attack.