COMMON AGENCY

被引：316

作者：

BERNHEIM, BD ^{[1
]}

WHINSTON, MD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912844

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：923 / 942

页数：20

共 23 条

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[2]

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[4] COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION [J].

BERNHEIM, BD ;

WHINSTON, MD .

[5]

BRAVERMAN A, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P695

[6]

DIAMOND PA, 1978, J PUBLIC EC, V13, P295

[7]

GREEN J, 1981, 862 HARV I EC RES DI

[8] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J].

GROSSMAN, SJ ;

HART, OD .

[9]

Hardy G. H., 1952, MATH GAZ

[10] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

RAVIV, A .