CONTROL AND INEFFICIENCY CAPITALIST PRODUCTION - THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

被引:4
作者
FAIRRIS, D
机构
[1] University of California, Riverside
关键词
POWER; INEFFICIENCY; LEGITIMACY; PRODUCTIVITY;
D O I
10.1080/00346769500000001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper offers a clarification of the terms and specific arguments associated with the radical claim that capitalist control of production leads to economic inefficiency. It argues that a greater understanding of the institutional features of the capitalist employment relation is required in order to make the claim compelling. The paper finds suggestive evidence in support of the radical claim in an institutional analysis of postwar labor-management relations in the U.S.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 29
页数:29
相关论文
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