REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING

被引：165
作者：
RADNER, R
机构：
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1985年 / 53卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1911017
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
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页码：1173 / 1198
页数：26
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