EXTENDING RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS TO INFINITE HORIZON GAMES

被引：25

作者：

ASHEIM, GB

机构：

[1] NORWEGIAN SCH ECON & BUSINESS ADM,N-5035 BERGEN,NORWAY

[2] UNIV BONN,W-5300 BONN,GERMANY

[3] HAIFA UNIV,IL-31999 HAIFA,ISRAEL

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1991年 / 3卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-E

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper extends the concept of a Pareto-perfect equilibrium to infinite horizon games, and offers a definition that covers both finitely and infinitely repeated games. An equilibrium is said to be Pareto-perfect if admitted by a Pareto-perfect social norm. A Pareto-perfect norm admits an equilibrium if and only if it cannot be profitably renegotiated in a norm-observing manner at a future contingency. The defined concept is compared to concepts that other writers have proposed. It departs from other concepts by insisting that nonviable equilibria be defeated through renegotiation by viable ones, and by not imposing a stationarity assumption. © 1991.

引用

页码：278 / 294

页数：17

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