Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that [1] rule with the aid of a dominant political party and [2] hold multi-party elections. Elite coalitions organized under the aegis of a hegemonic party are most vulnerable in elections that coincide with poor economic performance. A declining economy provides elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections. As a result, the likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties increases as income declines. This study's original dataset, which includes 227 elections for the chief executive in hegemonic party dictatorships from 1946 to 2004, and its case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.
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Univ Wisconsin, Polit Sci, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
HSE Univ, Moscow, RussiaUniv Wisconsin, Polit Sci, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
Reuter, Ora John
Szakonyi, David
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HSE Univ, Moscow, Russia
George Washington Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Polit Sci, Washington, DC 20052 USAUniv Wisconsin, Polit Sci, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
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Brunel Univ London, Dept Econ & Finance, London UB8 3PH, EnglandBrunel Univ London, Dept Econ & Finance, London UB8 3PH, England
Hashim, Zeeshan
Fidrmuc, Jan
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Univ Lille, Lille Econ Management, UMR 9221, F-59000 Lille, France
Bank Finland, BOFIT, Helsinki, Finland
PRIGO Univ, Havirov, Czech RepublicBrunel Univ London, Dept Econ & Finance, London UB8 3PH, England
Fidrmuc, Jan
Ghosh, Sugata
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Brunel Univ London, Dept Econ & Finance, London UB8 3PH, EnglandBrunel Univ London, Dept Econ & Finance, London UB8 3PH, England