SEEKING RENTS BY SETTING RENTS - THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING

被引：78

作者：

APPELBAUM, E ^{[1
]}

KATZ, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2232930

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：685 / 699

页数：15

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[8]

Buchanan J. M., 1962, CALCULUS CONSENT

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