LOBBYING AND COURNOT-NASH COMPETITION - IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY

被引：9

作者：

MOORE, MO ^{[1
]}

SURANOVIC, SM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV,ELLIOTT SCH INT AFFAIRS,WASHINGTON,DC 20052

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 35卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-1996(93)90025-S

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Arguments for strategic trade intervention with Cournot duopolists are reconsidered in a model where domestic firms can lobby for increased subsidies. An export subsidy may not improve national welfare if lobbying costs are included. Even if an optimal positive subsidy exists, the government needs information about lobbying effectiveness in order to correctly implement the program.

引用

页码：367 / 376

页数：10

共 12 条

[1] EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET SHARE RIVALRY
BRANDER, JA
SPENCER, BJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 18 (1-2) : 83 - 100
[2] POLITICAL INFLUENCE MOTIVES AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN TARIFFS AND QUOTAS
CASSING, JH
HILLMAN, AL
[J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 19 (3-4) : 279 - 290
[3] TARGETED EXPORT PROMOTION WITH SEVERAL OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES
DIXIT, AK
GROSSMAN, GM
[J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1986, 21 (3-4) : 233 - 249
[4] OPTIMAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL-POLICY UNDER OLIGOPOLY
EATON, J
GROSSMAN, GM
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 101 (02) : 383 - 406
[5] Grossman G. M., 1986, STRATEGIC TRADE POLI, P47
[6] EXPORT SUBSIDIES FOR DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
GRUENSPECHT, HK
[J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1988, 24 (3-4) : 331 - 344
[7] HILLMAN AL, 1988, AM ECON REV, V51, P59
[8] KRISHNA K, 1990, IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, P9
[9] Krugman PR., 1987, J ECON PERSPECT, V1, P131, DOI 10.1257/jep.1.2.131
[10] TRADE-POLICY WITH INCREASING RETURNS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION - CONTRADICTORY RESULTS FROM COMPETING ASSUMPTIONS
MARKUSEN, JR
VENABLES, AJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1988, 24 (3-4) : 299 - 316

← 1 2 →