CORE IMPLEMENTATION AND INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE FOR COOPERATION

被引：18

作者：

MOLDOVANU, B

WINTER, E

机构：

[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, DEPT ECON, IL-91904 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

[2] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM, CTR RATIONAL & INTERACT DECIS THEORY, IL-91904 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 23卷 / 06期

关键词：

NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING; CORE IMPLEMENTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

引用

页码：533 / 548

页数：16

共 17 条

[1]

Albers W., 1979, GAME THEORY RELATED

[2]

Aumann R., 1959, CONTRIBUTIONS THEORY, V4, P287, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400882168-018

[3]

Bennett E., 1983, International Journal of Game Theory, V12, P1, DOI 10.1007/BF01756101

[4] A NONCOOPERATIVE THEORY OF COALITIONAL BARGAINING [J].

CHATTERJEE, K ;

DUTTA, B ;

RAY, D ;

SENGUPTA, K .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1993, 60 (02) :463-477

[5] NONMANIPULABLE CORES [J].

DEMANGE, G .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (05) :1057-1074

[6]

ICHIISHI T, 1992, IN PRESS COOPERATIVE

[7]

MOLDOVANU B, 1991, IN PRESS GAMES EC BE

[8] CORES AND LARGE CORES WHEN POPULATION VARIES [J].

MOULIN, H .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1990, 19 (02) :219-232

[9]

PERRY M, 1991, NONCOOPERATIVE VIEW

[10]

ROSENMUELLER J, 1981, THEORY GAMES MARKETS

← 1 2 →